(a) arising from international agreements on mutual legal assistance or general criminal prosecutions and which are not particularly limited to the protection of intellectual property; The 2002 Doha Declaration confirmed that the TRIPS agreement should not prevent members from taking the necessary steps to protect public health. Despite this recognition, less developed countries have argued that flexible TRIPS provisions, such as mandatory licensing, are almost impossible to obtain. The least developed countries, in particular, have made their young domestic manufacturing and technological industries proof of the infallible policy. Unlike other IP agreements, TRIPS have an effective enforcement mechanism. States can be disciplined by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. In addition to the basic intellectual property standards set out in the TRIPS agreement, many nations have committed to bilateral agreements to adopt a higher level of protection. This collection of standards, known as TRIPS or TRIPS-Plus, can take many forms.  Among the general objectives of these agreements are: since the TRIPS agreement came into force, it has been criticized by developing countries, scientists and non-governmental organizations. While some of this criticism is generally opposed to the WTO, many proponents of trade liberalization also view TRIPS policy as a bad policy. The effects of the concentration of WEALTH of TRIPS (money from people in developing countries for copyright and patent holders in industrialized countries) and the imposition of artificial shortages on citizens of countries that would otherwise have had weaker intellectual property laws are common bases for such criticisms.
Other critics have focused on the inability of trips trips to accelerate the flow of investment and technology to low-income countries, a benefit that WTO members achieved prior to the creation of the agreement. The World Bank`s statements indicate that TRIPS have clearly not accelerated investment in low-income countries, whereas they may have done so for middle-income countries.  As part of TRIPS, long periods of patent validity were examined to determine the excessive slowdown in generic drug entry and competition. In particular, the illegality of preclinical testing or the presentation of samples to be authorized until a patent expires have been accused of encouraging the growth of certain multinationals and not producers in developing countries. former Deputy Director General of the Swiss Intellectual Property Office (now the Intellectual Property Institute) and Legal Adviser, Department of External Economic Relations (now Secretary of State for Economic Affairs); Chief negotiators in TRIPS, dispute resolution and subsidies during the Uruguay Round. Chair and member of several GATT and WTO panels. The author is Christophe Germann, a lawyer in Geneva and Zurich (DEA), a scientific collaborator at the Institute of Business Law at the University of Bern, for his support in the drafting of this text, and Matthias Studer, a scientific collaborator, for his assistance in the completion of the notes and the revision of the text. He is particularly grateful to the editors and Alice Zalik (formerly the U.S. Patent Office) for their detailed and stimulating comments on a previous project.
The structure and centre of gravity of this chapter, all the points of view expressed, the possible errors and omissions remain the sole responsibility of the author. An agreement reached in 2003 relaxed domestic market requirements and allows developing countries to export to other countries with a public health problem as long as exported drugs are not part of a trade or industrial policy.  Drugs exported under such regulations may be packaged or coloured differently to prevent them from affecting the markets of industrialized countries. the agreement