However, two types of agreements are excluded from these anti-compensation rules, both for public and private projects referred to in Article 2782(b), (1), (b)(2) and (c): certain agreements concluded with neighbouring owners (see § 2782.1) and certain agreements concluded with professional engineers providing inspection services for installations or installations (see § 2782.2). This extension of protection against compensation obligations can be seen in two aspects. First, as explained above, the amendment to Section 2782 has already invalidated clauses requiring a contractor to compensate a public body for its own “active negligence” (those referred to in Section 2782(b)(1) for contracts entered into before the 1st. unless the private owner acts as a supplier or supplier of materials or equipment for the factory [§ 2782(c)(1)), or an owner makes an improvement to his or her detached house (§2782(c)(3)). Where situation (c) (1) or (c) (3) is available, the anti-compensation rule in Section 2782(c)(1) does not apply when other anti-compensation rules should be considered, such as for example. B blocking section 2782 (a) against compensation for negligence or wilful misconduct (see above) or blocking section 2782.05 against compensation for active negligence (see below). A number of construction industry associations continue to make a commitment to the California legislature to limit contractual indemnification obligations. Until the law is amended to standardize indemnification obligations, contractors should carefully consider these obligations and be familiar with their legal obligations under such clauses. The Court of Justice justified this decision by the fact that compensation had to be awarded, since the negligence of the general contractor consisted only in not remedying a dangerous situation caused by the subcontractor`s infringement.

The Court of Appeal overturned the verdict for the subcontractor and ordered it. However, the Court of Appeal concluded that the sub-contractual indemnification clause did not seek compensation from the subcontractor for the general contractor`s active negligence and there was nothing else in the contract that indicated that the parties` intention was to pay compensation under these conditions. The court distinguished the case because in Morton Thiokol, the indemnified contractor (a general contractor) had charged him with assuming full responsibility for repairing an existing hazardous condition. . . .